Security problems with a chaos-based deniable authentication scheme by Alvarez, G.
ar
X
iv
:n
lin
/0
41
20
23
v1
  [
nli
n.C
D]
  9
 D
ec
 20
04
Security problems with a chaos-based deniable
authentication scheme
Gonzalo Alvarez ∗
Instituto de F´ısica Aplicada, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cient´ıficas,
Serrano 144—28006 Madrid, Spain
Abstract
Recently, a new scheme was proposed for deniable authentication. Its main orig-
inality lied on applying a chaos-based encryption-hash parallel algorithm and the
semi-group property of the Chebyshev chaotic map. Although original and prac-
ticable, its insecurity and inefficiency are shown in this paper, thus rendering it
inadequate for adoption in e-commerce.
1 Introduction
In recent years, chaos-based cryptography is drawing a great deal of attention
from researchers from a variety of disciplines [1–5]. One of the most interesting
encryption algorithms based on chaos proposed to date exploited the ergodic
property of chaotic orbits [6]. In the following years, many other works en-
hanced or analyzed its speed and security [7–14]. More recently, a new scheme
for deniable authentication making use of a chaos-based encryption-hash par-
allel algorithm and the semi-group property of the Chebyshev chaotic map
was proposed [15]. In this paper it is shown that the authors’ claim to be
“secure and efficient” may be contradicted.
2 The scheme
According to [16], the two main characteristics of deniable authentication are:
i) a sender S (also called prover in the literature) is able to authenticate a
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message m to a receiver R (also called verifier); and ii) the receiver R is
unable to convince a third party that a message m was authenticated by S.
An attacker M (acting as man-in-the-middle between S and R) should not
be able to authenticate a message m to R which S does not authenticate for
M.
Many different constructions of deniable authentication protocols have been
published based on traditional cryptography (see for example [16] and refer-
ences therein). Usually, these protocols require at a minimum a hashing algo-
rithm and a public key cryptography algorithm. The scheme proposed in [15]
uses the chaos-based encryption-hash parallel algorithm defined in [8,10] and
the Chebyshev chaotic map to realize key agreement, as proposed in [17].
2.1 Encryption-hash
The encryption-hash algorithm uses the logistic map
yn+1 = byn(1− yn),
where yn ∈ [0, 1] and the parameter is 3.99 < b < 4.0, so that it behaves
chaotically. Following [6], the interval [ymin, ymax], where 0 < ymin < ymax < 1,
is divided up into s = 256 subintervals, in one-to-one correspondence to as
many ASCII characters (see Fig. 1). The secret key is given by the initial
point y0 and the parameter value b. To encrypt an 8-bit block, i.e., an ASCII
character, the orbit is iterated starting from y0 as many times as necessary
until it lands on the subinterval corresponding to the given ASCII symbol.
The number of iterations is recorded as the corresponding block ciphertext.
This procedure is repeated until the plaintext is exhausted.
In [8], a dynamic table is used for looking up the ciphertext and plaintext,
which is no longer fixed during the whole encryption and decryption processes
as in [6]. Instead, it depends on the plaintext, being continuously updated
during the encryption and decryption processes. When the ith message block
is encrypted, the look-up table is updated dynamically by exchanging the ith
entry li with another entry lj . The location of the latter entry, i.e., the value
of j, is determined by the current value of y using the following formula:
υ =
⌊
y − ymin
ymax − ymin
× s
⌋
,
j = i+ υ mod s,
where ymin and ymax are the end points of the chosen interval [ymin, ymax) and
s is the total number of entries in the table [8].
2
In [10], the previously described chaotic cryptographic scheme is generalized
by allowing the swapping of multiple pairs of entries in the look-up table
during the encryption of each input block, and by allowing multiple runs
of encryption on the whole message continuously. Starting from the current
entry i, p pairs of entries (p ≥ 1) are swapped according to the following rule:
i ↔ (i + υ mod s), (i + υ + 1 mod s) ↔ (i + 2υ + 1 mod s), (i + 2υ + 2
mod s)↔ (i+3υ+2 mod s), . . . , (i+(p−1)υ+p−1 mod s)↔ (i+pυ+p−1
mod s). Once the message has been encrypted, the whole process is repeated
again r times, r ≥ 1. The final look-up table is the hash of the message [10].
2.2 Session key agreement
The key agreement protocol is based on Chebyshev polynomials and their
properties. The Chebyshev polynomial of degree n is defined as
Tn(x) = cos(n · arccos(x)), x ∈ [−1, 1].
The polynomial Tn(x) is recursively defined as
Tn+1(x) = 2xTn(x)− Tn−1(x), for any n > 0,
where T0(x) = 1 and T1(x) = x. Chebyshev polynomials verify the semi-
group property: Tp(Tq(x)) = Tpq(x); and also commute under composition:
Tp(Tq(x)) = Tq(Tp(x)). These two properties make them eligible for public key
cryptography and authentication [17].
The key agreement process described in [15] is as follows:
(1) S and R choose a publicly known random number x ∈ [−1, 1].
(2) S chooses a random large integer p, computes P = Tp(x) and sends P to
R.
(3) R chooses a random large integer q, computes Q = Tq(x) and sends Q to
S.
(4) S computes the secret key as k = Tp(Q) = Tp(Tq(x)).
(5) R computes the secret key as k′ = Tq(P ) = Tq(Tp(x)).
Due to the semi-group property, k = k′ = Tpq(x). All the communication steps
are susceptible to interception and manipulation by an attacker: x, P = Tp(x),
and Q = Tq(x) might be known or altered by the attacker acting as a man-in-
the-middle M. The security of this algorithm relies on the assumption that
given only the pair (x, Tn(x)) it is very difficult to compute the order of the
polynomial n.
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2.3 Deniable authentication protocol
Once S and R have agreed on a common session key k as described before,
S computes Ek(m) and obtains the hash value H(m) simultaneously. S sends
Ek(m) and H(m) to R. Now R can decrypt Dk(Ek(m)) = m using the same
session key k, obtaining simultaneously the hash value H ′(m). If both hashes
H and H ′ are identical, R is assured that the message m was sent by S. For a
more thorough description of the scheme, the reader is referred to the original
work [15].
3 Analysis of the scheme
In this section, the insecurity and inefficiency of the scheme proposed in [15]
are analyzed.
3.1 Security analysis of the scheme
The security of the encryption-hash algorithm [8, 10] was already studied in
[18], where it was showed that:
• The algorithm is vulnerable to chosen-ciphertext, chosen-plaintext and known-
plaintext attacks. As a consequence, implementations of this algorithm can
never reuse the same key because if so, they are easily broken.
• The look-up table, and thus the hash, does not depend on the key, but only
on the plaintext, thus facilitating cryptanalysis.
• Breaking the hash algorithm is possible when p = 1 and r = 1, even without
the knowledge of the key k (y0 and b). In fact, it is easy to find two different
messages m and m′ such that H(m) = H(m′).
These results imply that successive messages authenticated by S should always
use different session keys, thus reproducing the key agreement protocol every
time. This setting is fundamental to avoid the attacks mentioned in the first
bullet. In order to avoid the type of attacks on the hashing scheme described
in the third bullet, it is all important that r > 1 and p > 1. Due to the
complexity of the attacks, the reader is referred to [18] for a more detailed
explanation.
On the other hand, the security of the key agreement protocol was studied in
[19], where it was showed that an attack permits to recover the corresponding
plaintext from a given ciphertext. The same attack can be applied to produce
forgeries if the cryptosystem used for signing messages, as used in [15]. The
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weak spot of the protocol lies on the fact that there are several Chebyshev
polynomials passing through the same point. The attack works as follows.
It is assumed that M knows x, Tp(x) and Tq(x), which are publicly available
in the communication channel between S and R. To get the secret key k:
(1) M computes a p′ such that Tp′(x) = Tp(x).
(2) M recovers k = Tp′q(x) = Tp′(Tq(x)).
Given x and Tp(x), it can be efficiently computed an integer solution p
′ to the
equation Tp′(x) = Tp(x):
p′ =
± arccos(Tp(x)) + 2npi
arccos(x)
.
The reader is referred to [19] for the details on how to solve the previous
equation, using a system of two linear equations. This attack allows M to
actively forge a message from S toR, which makes the authentication property
fail (Sec. 3.2.2 in [15]), or to passively decrypt messages sent to R by S, which
makes the security property fail (Sec. 3.2.3 in [15]).
3.2 Efficiency analysis of the scheme
Finally, in [15] it is claimed that the chaos-based encryption-hash parallel
algorithm “saves certain computation time when compared with traditional
hashing and cryptographic methods”. This assertion might be interpreted in
the sense that their algorithm is faster than traditional hashing and crypto-
graphic methods, when in fact it is several orders of magnitude slower. Table 1
of [10] gives some results to illustrate the performance of the proposed chaotic
cryptographic and hashing algorithm. The performance depends on the values
of p and r. The best speed achieved is between 7.7 and 11.5 KB/s in a 1.8 GHz
processor. On the other hand, traditional encryption algorithms, such as DES
or AES, achieve speeds of 21.3 and 61.0 MB/s respectively in a 2.1 GHz pro-
cessor [20]. With respect to traditional hashing algorithms, MD5 and SHA-1,
the two most widely used, achieve speeds of 216.6 and 67.9 MB/s respectively
in a 2.1 GHz processor [20]. Thus, the claim is proved to be inadequate. As a
consequence, this algorithm is also very inefficient (between 1,000 and 10,000
times slower) when compared to similar traditional algorithms.
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4 Conclusion
The attacks proposed in [18] and [19] do not make the deniable authentication
protocol presented in [15] secure. An attacker can forge messages in the name
of the sender, thus violating the authentication requirement, and can decrypt
messages sent by the sender, thus violating the security (confidentiality) re-
quirement. On the other hand, the use of an encryption-hash algorithm based
on discrete chaotic maps and on the ergodic property of chaotic orbits greatly
reduces the protocol speed, making it inefficient as compared to other similar
protocols. After these attacks, it is concluded that the lack of security, along
with the low operation speed, may discourage the use of this scheme for secure
applications.
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Figures
Fig. 1. Schematic representation of how an attractor is divided into s subintervals,
each one with size ǫ = (ymax − ymin)/s. An alphabet unit is associated for each
subinterval.
